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Abstract 
Global warming is likely to force assertive redirection of global energy markets in order to 
achieve a prudent standard of mitigation; the resulting process of energy transformation will 
fundamentally alter prevailing policies and institutional relationships. Efficiency gains and 
renewable technologies—wind, solar, and biomass—will presumably make substantial 
contributions, as will carbon sequestration to some extent. But at the moment it seems quite 
apparent that global mitigation cannot be achieved without a very substantial expansion of 
nuclear power generation. While current light water reactor technology will likely play a role, 
this paper argues that smaller modular reactors (SMRs) of innovative design, with innovative 
institutional arrangements, could contribute to meeting energy demands in a more safe and 
secure manner. Though many SMR designs are currently being developed, it is doubtful that any 
of them will be brought to the point of serial production by their current developers under 
currently projected market conditions. Completed prototype development would almost certainly 
have to be a public sector initiative undertaken in support of eventual mitigation. This paper 
explores the potential of developing international structures whereby multiple states and entities 
could develop several SMR prototypes and serial manufacturing hubs. The International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor development process could prove to be a useful analogue 
to the arrangements necessary to support such large-scale SMR development and deployment. 
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What we do know 
There are good, even compelling reasons to expect: first, that global warming will eventually 
force assertive redirection of global energy markets in order to achieve a prudent standard of 
mitigation (e.g., stabilization at less than 500 ppm of CO2 equivalent); and second, that the 
resulting process of energy transformation will fundamentally alter prevailing policies and 
institutional relationships.  
Admittedly those expectations are well outside the bounds of actionable consensus at the 
moment, but they are driven by circumstances that are as reliably known as anything ever is. 
Most notably, we know that the thermal impulse currently being imparted to the earth’s 
atmosphere by human activity is unprecedentedly large and that the process of restoring 
equilibrium will assuredly have commensurately large consequences. That is basic physics, and 
it is beyond question. The timing, character, location and exact magnitude of those consequences 
are all massively uncertain, but the inevitable appearance of very large ecological adjustments is 
not.  
Put in common sense terms, there is a major storm assuredly coming, and it is powerful enough 
to alter the landscape—that is, the operating conditions, the prevailing attitudes, the institutional 
arrangements and the organizing policies of all human societies. For those who like adventure 
and are able to contemplate radical change, it is a gripping time to be alive.  
In terms of basic numbers, according to the IPCC fifth assessment report (AR5), total primary 
energy production is currently running just over 500 EJ/year, 85 percent of which derives from 
carbon emitting sources. It is prudent to assume that primary energy production will have to 
double by 2050 in order to support raising standards of living for a total human population of 8 
to 10 billion people. As that doubling occurs, the proportion of primary energy production 
produced by sources that do not emit carbon will have to increase to 80 percent to achieve the 
mitigation standard.1 AR5 projects that total demand will fall in the 950-1150 EJ/y range by 
2050 in baseline scenarios but only 800 EJ/y in their 480-530 ppm mitigation scenarios, 60 
percent of which would have to come from carbon-free sources. Efficiency gains and renewable 
technologies—wind, solar, and biomass—will presumably make substantial contributions, as 
will carbon sequestration to some extent. But at the moment it seems quite apparent that global 
mitigation cannot be achieved without a very substantial expansion of nuclear power generation.  
For the purpose of visualizing the potential implications, one can surmise that the current 370 
GWe installed nuclear generating capacity might have to increase up to 1900 GWe to meet the 
mitigation standard. Even a doubling of the current inventory of light water reactors—354 of the 
434 operating reactors—would provide less than half of that requirement, and it is very doubtful 
a doubling of reactors dependent on emergency cooling could be managed at adequate standards 
of safety. The impending storm presents some very big problems.  
                                                            
1IPCC WGIII AR5, chapter 7 p 10 ff.  
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 AR5 notes without elaboration that small modular reactors (SMR’s) are a potentially effective 
response to the power generation problem. That comment implicitly alludes to a radically 
different conception of how the nuclear power industry would work. The basic idea is that 
smaller reactors of standard design would be produced at manufacturing facilities rather than 
assembled on site. Cooling would be accomplished by natural circulation thereby precluding any 
possibility of a nuclear explosion or a core meltdown. The reactors would be transported to the 
service site by rail or truck for those in the 35 to 50 MWe range or by barge for those up to 300 
MWe. In the more advanced version of the concept a fuel load sufficient for 30 or more years of 
operation would be sealed in the reactor at the time of manufacture, and the reactor would be 
returned to the manufacturing site for disposition of its fuel at the end of its service life. In a yet 
more advanced version of the concept, operating reactors would be owned by the manufacturer 
throughout their lifetimes and would be operated remotely from the manufacturing site. Users 
would purchase power generation services not the reactors themselves.  
If nuclear power generation is to provide what would appear to be a minimum essential 
contribution to global mitigation by midcentury, then something like 170 EJ in primary energy 
would have to come from that source in 2050 providing some 15,000 TWh/y of electricity 
generation and requiring about 1900 GW of installed capacity. That would be about one-third of 
the notional 500 EJ requirement. Those levels could be reached if nuclear power generation 
increases by an average of 5 percent per year from 2012 to 2050, but sustained incremental 
growth from the current base is neither a feasible nor a desirable path from here to there. Scaling 
up to the levels required on the basis of currently available reactor designs and those currently 
projected under existing market conditions would pose operational safety and proliferation risks 
that are unlikely to be sustainable over the time required. Advanced SMR designs that would 
minimize those risks will not be available for at least a decade and not even then without policy 
initiatives that have not yet occurred. Moreover, the design requirements are not merely or even 
primarily technical in character. If we are to produce 170 EJ of primary energy by nuclear 
technology by midcentury at acceptable levels of safety, we will need more advanced 
coordination among national governments, higher standards of nuclear materials accounting, a 
global waste disposal arrangement and more fluid and more reliable provisions for equitable 
sharing of technical information.  
All that will, of course, require a dramatic change in prevailing attitudes. One of the main 
features of the global warming process is that it pits relentless circumstance against entrenched 
sentiment. One of the main questions posed is whether natural selection in this situation favors 
competition or collaboration. Given the magnitude and scope of the transformation required, it is 
prudent to bet on collaboration but important to recognize that over the next several decades, as 
environmental pressure accumulates and intensifies, we are destined to learn quite a bit about 
that.   
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Incremental evolution 
Anyone who hikes any distance in rough mountainous terrain quickly learns to balance attention 
between immediate steps and the intended destination. Regardless of how scenic the setting 
might be, as a practical matter, most of the time a hiker is obliged to watch the immediate 
placement of his or her foot. But unless the horizon is occasionally scanned and the still distant 
path visualized, the hiker in question is likely to become lost in the wilderness. In general, one 
moves in incremental steps but needs to keep the destination in mind, especially when there is 
serious question as to whether immediately available paths actually go there.  
So, with a mid-century mitigation standard visualized and with recognition that current roadways 
do not go there, the question is how to redirect without falling off a cliff or some equivalent 
misadventure. There is an evident technical response to that question that provides an obvious, 
specifiable start. Whatever else is done, prototype development of advanced SMR designs is an 
obvious priority, even though it is not alone a complete answer. Beyond that, redirection 
involves disputable, even highly disputable imagination with all the associated doubts and 
uncertainties, but nonetheless if collaboration proves to be essential then there will have to be 
institutional arrangements for accomplishing it.  
Prototype development. There are at least 26 nuclear reactor designs that fit the SMR concept to 
varying degrees.2 Many of them have passively safe cooling features important for reducing 
operating risk, but only one of them has the sealed fuel feature with long term (>30 year) service 
life that is especially important for minimizing proliferation risk. The different designs are 
currently under varying degrees of development as well, but it is doubtful that any of them will 
be brought to the point of serial production by their current developers under currently projected 
market conditions. Their ability to compete with low-cost generation technologies—natural gas 
in particular—is too much of a question to sustain commercial financing, as is their ability to 
meet licensing requirements established for current reactor designs. Moreover, in order to realize 
the advantages of serial manufacturing, developers would need a large number of initial orders to 
set up a manufacturing facility. Those three impediments are likely to prevent commercial 
vendors from completing prototype development of most and probably all of the current designs.  
As a result of these conditions, completed prototype development would almost certainly have to 
be a public sector initiative undertaken in support of eventual mitigation. Some set of 
governments would first have to select candidates for prototype development from among the 
contending options and then to bring the selected designs to the point that serial production could 
begin. Along the way a number of specific material and design issues would have to be solved 
and critical operating characteristics would have to be determined, in particular potential failure 
modes and the initial cost of power generation. With regard to failure modes, it will be important 
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The financial requirements of doing that much appear to be quite modest. A $5 billion program 
conducted over a decade could reasonably expect to bring two large (100-300 MW) and two 
small (35-50 MW) designs to the point that serial manufacture could begin.  
At that point the initial cost of generating power with the developed prototypes could be 
estimated with reasonable confidence, but the reduction that might be achieved by learning 
economies associated with serial manufacture would remain to be determined. Since ultimate 
competitiveness would depend on that effect, there is reason to believe that reactor production 
would have to depend on public financing well beyond the initial manufacturing phase. 
Moreover, the security and liability burdens imposed by the extreme destructive potential of 
nuclear technology might plausibly keep reactor production and associated fuel cycle services 
indefinitely dependent on public sector financial support.  
If 170 EJ/y of primary energy is to be provided by nuclear power generation in 2050 and if 50 
EJ/y is about the reasonable limit that might be provided by evolved variants of current LWR 
designs – roughly double the current amount – then the mitigation aspiration would have to be 
that by 2050 operational SMRs would provide 120 EJ/y of primary energy, generating 10,668 
TWh/y. Notionally that implies some 3,200 units averaging 250 MWe output and 7,200 units 
averaging 50 MWe output for a total of 10,400 power generating units. If they were produced 
over a 30-year time span with a 30-year service life, that implies a production rate of about 350 
units/year to be sustained indefinitely. It is, of course, unlikely to work out that neatly or 
decisively but those numbers give a rough idea of what mitigation would involve.  
Serial production. The point of developing alternative reactor designs is initially to hedge against 
intractable design problems not foreseen at the outset but eventually to assure competition 
among the ultimate manufacturers. It seems evident, however, that competition would have to be 
structured differently than it currently is. In a world driven by threatening circumstance into 
global energy transformation, the indispensable discipline of competition will have to be 
balanced by measures of mutual reassurance. No commercial vendor and no national government 
will be trusted with exclusive control over vital technology or energy generating services in a 
situation in which deeply entrenched interests in traditional energy services are being uprooted. 
Documented compliance with global standards and equitable access to vital services will qualify 
traditional commercial and national proprietary claims. It will have to be a different world in that 
important sense, featuring carefully specified and reliably managed transparency arrangements 
that have no immediate precedent.    
Among the many implications, one can reasonably surmise that both prototype development and 
serial production will have to be managed by one or more globally representative consortia open 
to qualified participation. Within the consortium all technology and all operating details would 
be equitably shared. What counts as globally representative would undoubtedly be a matter of 
spirited discussion and evolving judgment. It would certainly be impractical to include all UN 
members and probably even impractical to include all qualified aspirants. Membership would 
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presumably be limited by imposing investment requirements, but there would have to be national 
diversity criteria as well. To be considered globally representative, technically well-informed, 
and financially sound, the consortia would probably need to include the US, the EU, Russia, 
China and India as well as Japan, South Korea, Brazil ,South Africa and at least one 
representative from the Middle East. But whether that combination would be considered either 
necessary or sufficient needs to be debated and ultimately resolved.  
In judging how many competitive manufacturers a global market of 350 reactor units per year 
could sustain, experience with the production of wide-body aircraft is available as a crude 
analogy. Two manufactures have emerged in that market producing on the order of 80 planes per 
year between them. The technical demands of producing SMRs are not likely to be greater and 
probably would be less than producing highly quality aircraft. Operating at 40 units per year 
there would have to be 9 SMR manufacturing sites worldwide. If each site could produce 60 
units per year, 6 sites would cover the notional market demand, and that is a convenient number 
for working out geographic distribution. There is a strong presumption that China and India with 
40 percent of the world population between them would each host one of the sites. If the EU, 
Russia and the US all host a site, then countries in the Southern hemisphere could aspire to two 
sites at a minimum and could consider up to four.  
A coherent plan for specific site selection would feature highly quality security protection 
against armed assault, clandestine penetration and cyber intrusion. Probably that means isolated 
locations with dedicated power supply that nonetheless provide ready access to sea, road and 
railway transportation. In addition to reactor assembly lines, the sites would include uranium 
enrichment, fuel fabrication, and other services necessary to provide fuel for initial fabrication 
and to prepare depleted fuel for removal to a permanent depository at the end of the reactor’s 
service life. Under an advance arrangement, with each manufacturer operating the reactors it 
produces, the control facilities would be located at the site as well.  
In the institutional design of the consortium arrangement there is a central question as to whether 
there would be a single consortium overseeing all of the competing manufacturing sites or 
separate consortia operating each of the sites. In order to assure the discipline of competition 
among the sites, each would have to be vested with executive authority, but that would have to 
be qualified by common regulatory rules and reporting requirements. The vital importance of the 
product and the inherent dangers in producing it makes nuclear power generation a public utility 
not merely a private enterprise designed to make money.  
Material accounting. Since each significant quantity of a nuclear explosive isotope—25kg for 
highly enriched uranium 235 and 8 kg for plutonium—is capable of putting up to one million 
people at risk, it would certainly be desirable and is in principle technically feasible to keep track 
of that material with at least enough accuracy to assure responsible use. Institutionally, however, 
the world as a whole is very far from being able to do that. Nuclear material production has 
occurred under national control managed by separate national accounting systems, none of which 
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measured their historic isotope production with that degree of accuracy. Nor do the separate 
national systems inform each other about their level of isotope production to anything like that 
level of accuracy. At the moment, global accounting of nuclear explosive isotope production has 
uncertainties ranging in the thousands, even tens of thousands of significant quantities – that is, 
weapon equivalents.  
Given this historical legacy, it is doubtful that accuracy to the level of a significant quantity 
could ever be achieved, but it certainly can be very substantially and very meaningfully 
improved. And the formation of consortia for SMR production would provide both the incentive 
and the opportunity for doing so by establishing a common nuclear material accounting system 
that encompasses all of their nuclear material holdings. Even if that system covered only the 
consortium producers at the outset, it would provide the institutional basis for a comprehensive 
system including national as well as consortium inventories. By applying advanced sensing and 
information processing technology, such a system could enable a much higher standard of 
nuclear material inventory control and could become progressively more accurate and more 
reliable over time.  
A comprehensive and progressively improving accounting system is certainly important and 
arguably vital for preserving the nonproliferation regime. As is often noted, the Non-proliferation 
treaty (NPT) established a discriminatory regime allowing five states to possess nuclear weapons 
and prohibiting all other signatories from doing so. But, as is less frequently mentioned, Article 
VI of the treaty also commits all signatories to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons 
thereby subordinating initial discrimination to an ultimately equitable standard. Since it is 
evident as a practical matter that any close approach to elimination would require more accurate 
accounting than currently prevails, the development of a more advanced accounting system is an 
essential requirement for any serious effort to implement Article VI of the treaty. There is as yet 
no official effort to develop such a system, but arguably that would be the single most telling test 
of good faith.  
Although the issue of accounting is not currently prominent, it has potential to become so in 
response to any serious incident in which custody of nuclear explosive isotopes eludes 
responsible national control. There have been many minor incidents of that sort, but none as yet 
prominent enough to command sustained scrutiny. It is essentially impossible to determine the 
objective probability of such an event, but if one occurred, current accounting arrangements are 
likely to be subjected to withering criticism and more advanced arrangements would command 
attention.  
Alternatively the idea of consortium control over fuel cycle services with embedded accounting 
arrangements might well acquire immediate prominence in the context of the ongoing dispute 
over Iran’s nuclear materials production activities. The United States accuses Iran of preparing a 
nuclear weapons program in violation of its NPT obligations. Iran denies any intention to acquire 
a nuclear weapon but insists on its right to enrich uranium and to produce plutonium under the 
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provisions of the NPT. In seeking a consensual outcome, the United States has been attempting 
to impose restrictions on Iran’s enrichment capacity thereby abridging or at any rate restricting 
the right it proclaims. Iran is resisting any such restriction but appears open to a limitation on its 
accumulated nuclear material such that the potential for weapons production would remain 
perpetually beyond a reasonable time horizon. A compromise agreement might involve 
construction of a reactor fuel fabrication facility in Iran to be jointly operated with a 
collaborating partner with the understanding that consortium arrangements would eventually 
become the dominant arrangement for access to fuel cycle services for all countries From Iran’s 
point of view that would remove the element of discrimination, would establish its rights, would 
assure equitable access to economically efficient fuel cycle services, and would give it access to 
state of the art technology it is unlikely to be able to match on its own anytime soon. From the 
U.S. point of view that would impose a reliable time constraint on any Iranian attempt to acquire 
nuclear weapons, would assure timely detection of any such attempt, and would legitimize 
coercive measures in response.  
 
How might it happen? 
If incremental evolution is to occur in anticipation of eventual mitigation, there will have to be 
some immediate initiative to begin the process of consortium formation and reactor prototype 
development. That will not spontaneously occur under current and reasonably projected market 
conditions, and it cannot occur as the exclusive initiative of any national government. It is 
nonetheless plausibly realistic to imagine that such an initiative might emerge from a G20 
summit meeting in which the participants were eager to signal serious concern for global 
warming mitigation while remaining unwilling to impose a common price on carbon emissions. 
By pooling their resources, the G20 members could provide a $5 billion development fund with 
another $5 billion contingency supplement without creating a burdensome budget allocation 
problem for any one of them. That much is not beyond the immediate limits of practical politics.  
There is partial precedent for such an initiative in the International Thermonuclear Experimental 
Reactor project commonly known as ITER, a consortium project to develop and operate a fusion 
reactor. The original idea was advanced at a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in 1985, but it evolved 
into an EU-hosted project with the participation of China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and 
the United States that was formally initiated in 2007. As host, the EU is to bear 45 percent of the 
development and operating costs with the six other partners providing equal 9 percent shares. 
The original plan envisaged a 30-year project—10 years for construction of the reactor and 20 
years of operation—at an estimated cost of €5billion. That estimate has subsequently grown to 
€16billion. It was the cost burden and questionable practicality of the project that inspired the 
consortium arrangement. ITER is designed to produce 500 MW output but only for up to 1,000 
seconds.  
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An SMR development consortium would be far more practical, in that it would produce reactor 
designs that are technically much less demanding and could actually be used for base-load power 
generation. Like any development project it would be susceptible to cost increases beyond the 
original estimates but nothing like ITER has been. ITER remains in the realm of basic research 
rather than prototype development. But an SMR consortium would have to be more integrally 
organized as well. ITER assigns separate responsibility for developing specific reactor 
components to each of the national partners. An SMR consortium would have to involve the 
participating partners in all aspects of the design and manufacture of the resulting reactor 
prototypes. The skill of the project managers would be a critical determining ingredient, but there 
are people in all of the candidate participating countries who could do it. If the G20 could 
manage not only to finance a development project but to mandate an integrated organizational 
design and to select a competent team, there is good prospect that incremental development 
could be set on a transformative path. That would not relieve the burden of ultimately setting a 
global carbon price, but it would provide the basis for response when and if that occurs. It would 
provide meaningful incentive as well.  
*************** 
Returning to the hiker metaphor, response to global warming will surely occur in incremental 
steps, but in terrain as uncharted as this situation is it is quite import to visualize the ultimate 
outcome in undertaking incremental measures. We are not likely to achieve mitigation unless we 
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